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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAR DOCTOR, INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
No. 17239 
ANTHONY BELMONT and 
GREGORY OLINYK, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover $25,000.00 paid by plain-
tiff to defendants as a contribution for a proposed partner-
ship. Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to return of the 
funds on the basis of an agreement among the parties that cer-
tain conditions would be met before the partnership would become 
effective and that those conditions were not met. Defendants 
counterclaimed alleging that plaintiff had failed to meet a 
commitment to provide additional financing, thereby causing 
loss of certain business opportunities. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court and judgment was entered 
in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $25,000.00, plus interest 
and costs; the defendants' counterclaim was dismissed. 
-1-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In about February of 1977, the officers of plaintiff 
Car Doctor, Inc., David Robinson and Gordon Giles, met the 
defendants, Gregory Olinyk and Anthony Belmont. (R. 105, 
lines 9-30; R. 106, lines 1-10.) The parties began negotia-
tions concerning the formation of a partnership to operate a 
private liquor club and restaurant in Ogden, Utah. (R. 106, 
lines 20-30.) 
On March 4, 1977, the parties executed a preliminary 
agreement (Exhibit 3-P) setting forth certain conditions which, 
must be met before any partnership among the parties would be· I 
come effective. The agreement also provided that if the co~~/ 
tions were not met, monies contributed by plaintiff would~ 
refunded. On that same day, plaintiff delivered a check in 
amount of $10,000.00, payable to defendant Gregory Olinyk 
(Exhibit 1-P). The check was delivered to Olinyk and made 
payable to him based on his representations that the opportuni:. 
contemplated for the operation of the partnership business wou'. 
be lost if monies were not paid immediately. (R. 107, lines 
23-27.; R. 108, lines 14-19.) 
As a substitute for placing the funds in escrow, and be-
cause of the immediate need for cash, defendant Olinyk executes 
and delivered a promissory note in the amount of $10, 000 · OO to 
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-plaintiff to guarantee repayment of the funds if the partner-
ship did not become effective. (Exhibit 2-P) (R. 109, line 30; 
R. 110, lines 1-5, 21-27.) 
On March 9, 1977, the parties executed an agreement to 
govern the operation of the partnership once the conditions 
were met. (Attachment to Exhibit 3-P.) 
On March 11, 1977, plaintiff delivered a check to defen-
dant Anthony Belmont, in the amount of $15,000.00, made payable 
to defendant Belmont. (Exhibit 4-P.) Again, defendants repre-
sented to plaintiff's officers that there was an urgent and 
inunediate need for funds. In addition, defendants indicated 
that the five (5) conditions set forth in the agreement (Exhibit 
3-P) could not be met until the private liquor club, to be known 
as the Winery, was open and operating and that the club could 
not be open unless plaintiff provided the funds inunediately. 
(R. 114, lines 17-25.) 
The five conditions set forth in Exhibit 3-P were never 
met. (R. 116, lines 26-30; R. 117, lines 1-2; Findings of Fact, 
no. 3.) 
This action was filed in June of 1977. Defendants Olinyk 
and Belmont continued to operate the business until August of 
1977. (R. 182, lines 24-25.) 
During the time the Winery was operated, plaintiff's 
officers were never allowed to examine its books and records. 
(R. 118, lines 17-20; R. 147, lines 24-30.) 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PARTNERSHIP l'IAS 
NOT EFFECTIVE IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The Court has repeatedly held that in a case tried ~ 
the court, when the findings of the trial court are based oc 
substantial evidence, this Court will not disturb them on arr,; 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary. 5, 
~· Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P.2d 393 (Utah 1977); Zions Firs: 
National Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 534 P.2~ 
900 (Utah 1975). In this case, appellants have not argued L: 
the findings of the trial court that the agreed conditions we:, 
never fulfilled and the partnership did not become ef fecti~ 
were not based on substantial, admissible and competent evid1': 
(Findings of Fact, nos. 3 and 7.) 
Instead, appellants argue that either there was de~ 
compliance with the conditions or a waiver of them. (Appell;:.: 
Brief, pg. 4.) In support of those propositions, appellants 
cite certain isolated aspects of testimony. However, as the 
foregoing statement of facts indicates, the record contains 
substantial evidence that the conditions had not been met. I:. 
addition, defendant Belmont himself testified that conditiOO 
was not met (R. 178, lines 4-10) and that condition 4 was no: 
satisfied (R. 104, lines 12-20.) 
As to the issue whether plaintiff waived performan~c 
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the conditions, appellants have cited no direct evidence in 
support of their argument that performance of the conditions 
was waived. This Court has held that "waiver must be an inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right". Bjork v. April 
Industries, Inc., 547 P.2d 219, 220 (Utah 1976). Nothing 
in the record supports the contention that plaintiff's 
officers intentionally relinquished plaintiff's right to 
performance of the conditions set forth in the agreement. 
This Court has held that, on appeal, it must view the 
evidence, including the fair inferences to be drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the successful party below. 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977). The infer-
ences to be drawn from the evidence in this case do not support 
appellant's contentions that the conditions had been met or 
waived. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE PART-
NERSHIP BECAME EFFECTIVE. 
Appellants argue that plaintiff is estopped by its con-
duct from denying the existence of a partnership. As their sole 
legal authority for that proposition, appellants cite Utah Code 
~ §48-1-13 (Repl. Vol. 1970). That section provides as 
follows: 
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When a person by words spoken or written or 
by conduct represents himself, or consents 
to another's representing him, to anyone as 
a partner, in an existing partnership or 
with one or more people not actual partners, 
he is liable to any such person to whom such 
representation has been made who has on the 
faith of such representation given credit 
to the actual or apparent partnership, and, 
if he has made such representation or con-
sented to its being made in a public manner, 
he is liable to such person, whether the 
representation has or has not been made or 
communicated to such person so giving credit 
by, or with the knowledge of, the apparent 
partner making the representation or consenting 
to its being made. 
The obvious purpose of this section is to guarantee tt"' 
one who holds himself out as a partner in a partnership and 
thereby induces third persons to grant credit to the partner-
ship will be liable for partnership obligations. Nothing in 
I 
the statute is directed toward determining rights and obligati::! 
as between and among the partners themselves. I 
Plaintiff, through its agents, did nothing in this case 
to represent to defendants that the partnership was effectiw. 
In their counterclaim, defendants did not even seek to recover 
for amounts defendant Belmont may have expended for payment oi 
trade creditors of the operations of the Winery. Nor was a 
partnership tax return filed. 
Appellants seek to rely on certain actions undertaken b 
plaintiff's agents which appellants contend amount to particico 
tion in the partnership business and creating an appearance 0 
the existence of a partnership. However, the issue whether 
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these actions might have been sufficient to create liability 
on plaintiff's part to third persons who extended credit to 
a supposed partnership is not before the Court. Appellants 
acted with full knowledge of the situation and the existence 
of the agreement and could not have been said to have relied 
on the actions of plaintiff's agents. Neither appellant testi-
fied that plaintiff's officers represented by words or conduct 
that plaintiff would not require full performance of the condi-
tions. 
This Court has held that an estoppel may occur when con-
duct by one party leads another party, in reliance on the conduct, 
to adopt a course of action which results in detriment if the 
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct. Carnesecca v. 
Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977). Appellants have not argued 
that plaintiff's agents led them to believe that plaintiff would 
not seek to enforce defendants' obligations under the preliminary 
agreement (Exhibit 3-P) . 
Appellants contend that the participation of plaintiff's 
officers in the operation of the Winery was so extensive that 
that conduct is sufficient to create an estoppel to deny the 
existence of a partnership. However, the conduct of plaintiff's 
officers is consistent with their testimony that defendants repre-
sented that there was a great need for haste in opening and oper-
ating the private club. Moreover, plaintiff's participation in 
that operation occurred, for the most part, at the beginning of 
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the operation. For example, plaintiff's officers assisted 1 .. 
preparing the premises for opening (R. 124, lines 18-25) and 
acted as greeters during the grand opening (R. 124, lines 2: ... 
During the time the Winery oi:erated, however, plaintiff's o::.! 
were not allowed to examine i ':s books and records and in fact 
in April or May were excluded from the club so that they wou:• 
not "interfere" with its operations. (R. 191, lines 3-11). 
In addition, even after plaintiff filed this action 1: 
June of 1977, defendants continued to operate the club. ~~~ 
I 
Olinyk testified that in July he made a $10,000.00 contrib~t:: 1 
to the operation as required by the agreement signed in r~r~. 
(R. 218, lines 26-30; R. 214, lines 16-21.) It is difficult·, 
understand how those actions could be said to have been unde:·I 
taken in reliance on plaintiff's participation once the laws·J 
I 
had been filed. 
Throughout the short time period that the Winery oper0:j 
I 
defendants acted with full knowledge of plaintiff's status ar.: 
the status of the proposed partnership. For that reason, the I 
limited participation by plaintiff's officers in the ear~ 5~ 
of the club's operation cannot support an estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court found that defendants agreed to 
satisfy certain conditions before a partnership would beco~ 
effective and that those conditions were never met. Those f:·I 
a~e supported by substantial evidence. At the trial, appell) I 
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argued that the conditions were waived and that plaintiff 
should be estopped to deny the existence of a partnership. 
Having considered those arguments in the light of the evidence, 
the trial court determined that the partnership did not become 
effective. Nothing in the record compels this Court to overturn 
those findings. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KRUSE, LANDA, ZIMMERMAN & MAYCOCK 
620 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
I ---
B ··'/!)- /le,_ Y~·~_;/-~~:....<;::.,.,',.,,:;;.,..,,~;--~-:-'~~~~~~ 
ELLEN MAYCOCK I 
----· 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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